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11  Industry-Specific 
Nont  ariff 
Trade Barriers 
Introduction 
This section analyzes three nontariff measures aimed at easing the 
competitive problems of  particular U.S. industries. They are the agree- 
ment by the Japanese to limit their exports of  automobiles to the United 
States, the dumping problems of the U.S. steel industry and the resulting 
Trigger Price Mechanism for steel imports, and the Multifiber Arrange- 
ment for quantitative import restrictions covering textile and apparel 
products. 
Feenstra focuses on the quality, employment, and welfare effects of the 
Japanese voluntary export restraint agreement (VER) in automobiles. 
Using hedonic regressions to determine changes in the quality-adjusted 
prices of  U.S.  and Japanese cars, he concludes that two-thirds of  the 
inflation-adjusted 8.4 percent rise in the price of imported cars in the two 
years following the VER is due to quality improvements and one-third to 
an increase in the quality-adjusted price of Japanese cars. Consequently, 
there was about a 3 percent rise in price for which consumers were not 
compensated by improved quality. Under the assumption that a reduc- 
tion of (say) $1 million spent on Japanese imports due to a price change 
leads  to an extra $1 million spent on American cars, Feenstra  then 
estimates  that  the  increased  employment  resulting  from  the  VER 
amounted only to between 5,000 and 22,000 workers. As he notes, these 
figures compare  with  indefinite  layoffs in  the auto industry  of  over 
200,000 workers in early 1982. 
Eichengreen and van der Ven concentrate on the U.S. steel industry in 
analyzing dumping from both a theoretical and empirical point of view. 
Using the Trigger Price Mechanism (TPM) introduced by the U.S. gov- 
ernment in 1978 as an illustration, they show how trade policies often 
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evolve that make good sense politically but not economically. They then 
develop a model of  dumping that emphasizes the existence of  imperfect 
competition in both domestic and foreign markets and utilize it to esti- 
mate the effects of the TPM in 1979. In raising the price of imported steel 
by, in effect, establishing a minimum import price, the TPM increased 
the income of U.S. steel producers but reduced the economic welfare of 
consumers. However, as Eichengreen and van der Ven demonstrate, it is 
possible for total welfare to increase as a result of the TPM because of the 
initial distortion associated with imperfectly competitive domestic mar- 
kets. Their welfare estimates vary from a net gain of $6 billion to a net loss 
of  $.03 billion. Of course, as they note, if  antidumping policies can be 
welfare improving because of distortions in domestic markets, first-best 
policies aimed at promoting competition can raise welfare even more. 
Pelzman traces the long and complicated history of  international reg- 
ulation of  textile and apparel imports and indicates how the structure of 
the U.S. textile industry has changed since World War 11. He then tries to 
ascertain empirically whether the Multifiber Arrangement (MFA) had a 
positive effect on the industry’s profit rates. Using the percentage of 
imports subject to quantitative restrictions to proxy for the MFA and 
controlling for such factors as the degree of  market concentration, the 
growth of  domestic demand, and the extent of import penetration, Pelz- 
man finds evidence that the MFA did indeed appear to raise profit rates 
by limiting domestic competition. 